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Elena Ceauşescu’s Personality Cult and Romanian Television
Abstract: Elena Ceauşescu, spouse of the Romanian communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu, 
generated in the 1980s a gigantic homage industry, as she was the object of a personality 
cult as strong as that of her husband’s. This paper briefly outlines the origin and elements 
of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s personality cult, to focus then on Elena Ceauşescu’s cult: how at 
first it was merged with the cult of her husband, her being a mere companion of the head 
of state, and then grew to the point of paralleling that of Nicolae Ceauşescu during the last 
years of communist rule in Romania. The second part focuses on the evolution of Roma-
nian state television and its crucial role in the diffusion of her personality cult, showing 
how this state institution became completely subordinated to the presidential couple in 
the 1980s, and pointing to a paradox of the period: the shorter Romanian television’s daily 
broadcasting time, the larger the amount of programming on Ceauşescu. Finally, the paper 
shows how January was infused with anniversary dates meant to consolidate the personal-
ity cult of the presidential couple and to reinvent communist traditions.
Keywords: personality cult, Elena Ceauşescu, Nicolae Ceauşescu, Romania, communism, 
television, media studies
Even though we usually associate dictators, tyranny and personality cult with men, it has not prevented some women from understanding the mecha-
nisms of power just as well. As a rule neglected by historians, the women who 
stood at the side or in the shadow of dictators often had real political power 
themselves. Considered as authentic tragic heroines by a few authors, resem-
bling “those of Racine in their pride or of Flaubert in their silliness” (Ducret 
2013: 10), they were generally demonized by their people and their memory was 
most of the time kept only orally. Antipathy towards these women was, and is, 
often much greater than towards their male partners-in-crime, which may be 
a reason for the relative lack of scholarly interest. Elena Ceauşescu, wife of the 
Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu, was one of the few spouses of commu-
nist leaders to have a high political profile of her own, being deeply involved in 
party administration. All through the 1980s, until their execution in December 
1989, she was the second most influential Romanian, after Ceauşescu himself, 
and was the object of a personality cult as intense as that of her husband. In her 
craving for power, in her cynicism and cruelty, she was similar to Nexhmije Ho-
hxa, spouse of the Albanian leader Enver Hohxa, or Margot Honecker, wife of 
the GDR head of state, Erich Honecker. She shared most in common with Jiang 
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Qing, wife of Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party and Paramount 
leader of China, who impressed and inspired her deeply during the 1971 visit of 
the Ceauşescus to the People’s Republic of China.
And yet, Elena Ceauşescu distinguished herself from the other wives of 
communist leaders. Tons of published Omagiu (homage) in her honour, thou-
sands of radio and TV broadcast hours praising the “Mother of the Nation”, lies 
about her age and education, the charade about her scientific accomplishments 
(from a doctoral degree in chemistry to the title of academician) trying to con-
ceal her abysmal ignorance and infinite vanity, a whole gigantic homage industry 
built around Elena Ceauşescu set her apart in the pantheon of communist first 
ladies. Perhaps in no other totalitarian system with a cult of the leading lady did 
adulatory practices reach such proportions as in Romania. Practically, the two 
presidential spouses enjoyed two parallel worship structures, which intersected 
at certain points.
The demonization of Elena Ceauşescu after the Romanian Revolution 
of December 1989 was reflected in staggeringly high disapproval ratings. Public 
opinion polls conducted more than twenty years after the fall of communism 
showed that 87 % of Romanians saw her negatively, whereas only 45 % felt the 
same about Nicolae Ceauşescu.1 Today, almost thirty years after her death, with 
her fading in collective memory, she still seems to be a taboo topic for research-
ers, which translates into a silence “based on moral and pseudo-cognitive rea-
sons” (Olteanu 2004). While books about Nicolae Ceauşescu, his dictatorship 
and personality cult are still being written, Elena is hardly ever mentioned. 
Nicolae Ceauşescu’s personality cult 
From today’s perspective, the personality cult of the Romanian dictator Nicolae 
Ceauşescu belongs into one of the most fascinating and horrifying chapters of 
Romanian history, and it has attracted considerable scholarly attention.2 In the 
post-Stalin era, in this part of Europe, Ceauşescu’s systematic and theatrical cult 
can only be compared to that of Enver Hoxha’s in communist Albania; on the 
global contemporary scene, it has similar features to that of the Chinese com-
munist leader Mao Zedong, who greatly inspired the Romanian dictator. 
 Nicolae Ceauşescu was probably the most celebrated Romanian of all 
times, if we consider the masses of people involved in manifestations dedicated 
1 According to a poll conducted by INSCOP Research in November 2013 (http://www.
inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/INSCOP-noiembrie-ISTORIE.pdf [retrieved 1st 
August 2017]).
2 See e.g. Fischer 1989; Burakowski 2011; Cioroianu 2004, 2010; Durandin 1990. For a criti-
cal analysis of the books on the personality cult of Nicolae Ceauşescu signed by foreign or 
Romanian authors, see Marin 2016, 22–25.
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to him, the hundreds of congratulatory telegrams from ambassadors and heads 
of state, the parties organized and the gifts received, but also the huge space 
allotted to him in the mass-media (Avram 2014). In the beginning it was the 
printed press but later, after the introduction of television, this medium also 
came under the control of the Romanian dictator and helped expand the eulogy 
industry to absurd proportions.
As it was effectively put in an article on the dictator’s career trajectory, 
Ceauşescu’s life started at 50 (ibid.). More exactly, his personality cult started ris-
ing from that date on. His birthday, 26th January, was forcefully and suddenly 
brought to public attention in 1968, when he turned 50, a month after he became 
President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania. On 26th 
January 1968, Scânteia, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) newspaper, 
featured the headline “Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu turned 50”, with the piece 
signed by the RCP Central Committee, the State Council and the Council of 
Ministers
Expectedly, Nicolae Ceauşescu’s birthday was celebrated with greater 
pomp at round figures. After 1968, the first major celebration was in 1973, when 
he turned 55, after the 1971 visit to China and North Korea. From 1973 until 
the end of his life, he would go on working visits to different regions of the 
country or factories in Bucharest on the eve of his birthday, and homage texts 
and congratulations would start arriving and being published a few days before 
and would cease a few days after 26th January. After 1973, Romanian intellectu-
als and writers also engaged in the homage charade with their letters and odes 
to “the first man of the country”, and later also to his wife. Tons of publications 
under the title Omagiu will forever remain “evidence of unimaginable human 
degradation, partly imposed, partly voluntary”, as “moral mud was the vital sub-
stance of the Golden Age” (Tismăneanu 2015).
In the late 1960s, when Ceauşescu’s personality cult started off, it also played 
a role in putting up resistance to Moscow. Its main source was the Stalinist tradi-
tion, as Ceauşescu gradually replaced Stalin in the political imagery of the RCP, 
but it also had roots in the Romanian national tradition, since Ceauşescu sought 
to emulate King Carol II of Romania. Finally, after his 1971 visit to China and 
North Korea, Ceauşescu, deeply impressed by the dynastic communism of the 
Asian countries, also adopted the Asian model (Cioroianu 2010 (1)). Despite its 
diverse sources of inspiration, Ceauşescu’s cult had distinctive features, directly 
connected to the very nature of original Romanian communism3: Byzantine im-
perial glorification rituals were fused with Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy claims. 
The scenery was grotesque and delusional but, as ironic as it may seem, it was 
3 Tismăneanu (2012, 466) defines Ceauşescu’s socialism as “totalitarianism Romanian-style, 
a combination of Stalinism, Third World-ism, and Byzantinism”, which “could never fully 
overcome its pariah genealogy”.
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this ubiquitous and sultry personality cult that enshrined Ceauşescu for eternity 
in the history of Marxist beliefs (Tismăneanu 2015).
Ceauşescu was depicted simultaneously as “the main doctrinaire, the vi-
sionary genius, and the ‘architect of national destiny’” (Tismăneanu 2012, 468). 
Words, colours and images built a Nicolae Ceauşescu with several mythic facets: 
he was the revolutionary, the theoretician of a new world order, the champion 
of peace, the architect of a new Romania, the hero of independence, the guar-
antor of national unity, the most beloved son – or father – of the nation etc. 
(Cioroianu 2010 (2)).
But this grotesque cult of personality in no way contributed to the cred-
ibility of the Romanian leader. On the contrary, it may be described as a text-
book example of political ineffectiveness: if Ceauşescu was a popular and cred-
ible leader in Romania at the end of the 1960s, after his brave move in 1968 
(condemning the Warsaw pact and the military intervention in Czechoslovakia), 
the next twenty years only reinforced the impression that the man whom Roma-
nians had genuinely trusted was transforming into a mere caricature. Not sur-
prisingly, at the climax of his personality cult in the late 1980s Nicolae Ceauşescu 
was much less popular in Romania than before he had become the object of this 
blind idolatry (Cioroianu 2010 (1)). Instead of bringing him closer to the people, 
this “ephemeral, shaky and questionable” construction (Tismăneanu 2015) of a 
Messianic leader fenced Ceauşescu off the Romanian people and in the gloomy 
1980s made him one of the most hated figures, probably second in notoriety 
only to his wife, Elena Ceauşescu.
In December 1989, only a month after he was unanimously re-elected as 
head of the RCP, he and his wife were turned over to a firing squad and execut-
ed. The architects of the cult of Nicolae Ceauşescu had in fact worked against 
him and against an initially very promising situation. In the end, Ceauşescu was 
intoxicated by power, more and more convinced of the reality of their artificial 
and absurd construction and unable to divorce himself from it.
Elena Ceauşescu’s rise to power and glorification 
In the beginning Elena Ceauşescu was just the wife of the Secretary Gener-
al of the Romanian Communist Party. Her presence at his side was meant to 
strengthen the belief of the people that the head of the party, apart from be-
ing a patriot, was also a family man. As the wife of a communist leader, Elena 
Ceauşescu seemed to the Western eye more down-to-earth and relaxed than her 
counterparts, a possible sign of normalization: “When Ceauşescu announced 
his policy of international opening, the public appearance of Elena Ceauşescu, 
clumsy and uncultured as she was, was felt like a sign of normalization; in com-
parison with the symbolic bachelorhood of the Stalinist era, the new masters’ 
matrimony seemed auspicious. Between Khrushchev’s stumpy wife and elegant 
http://www.balcanica.rs
A. Sorescu Marinković, Elena Ceauşescu’s Personality Cult 347
Raisa Gorbachev, Ceauşescu’s wife seemed to mark a new political style, more 
relaxed and attentive to individual values” (Petre 1995, 265).
Moreover, she made a break with tradition: she was selling the idea that 
she succeeded owing to her professional competence, creating the illusion of a 
ruling elite being recruited based on merit. The political and economic emanci-
pation of women formed part of the mythic history of socialist women fabricated 
during the Ceauşescu regime, and Romania’s transformation could not happen 
without a New Woman, whom Elena was now embodying. Consequently, the 
propaganda campaigns promoting the inclusion of women in the labour force 
and politics after 1973 were motivated, according to some authors, by two main 
factors: the demand for additional labour force and the need to legitimize the 
scientific career of Elena Ceauşescu (Kligman 1998, 129).
By 1979, when her personality cult entered a new, absolutist, phase, Elena 
Ceauşescu had accumulated a solid symbolic capital, being presented as a person 
who harmoniously combined the qualities of a wife, a mother, a revolutionary, a 
scientist and a politician (Olteanu 2004). By 1979, she turned from a mere back-
ground presence into an important social figure. However, before her legend 
could be created, the gaping void in her legitimacy had to be filled, at least at a 
discursive level. Her husband had already been a legitimate leader when he be-
came head of the party; her cult, by contrast, depended both on external and on 
internal factors: firstly, her scientist image floated on the quicksand of falsehood, 
duplicity and ignorance; secondly, she had to come second to the leader. Since 
every personality cult is in fact a mythology, the Ceauşescu couple fitted per-
fectly into a coherent and hierarchical mythological system: “Nicolae Ceauşescu 
was the supreme almighty god, and his wife was a demigod” (ibid.).
In spite of the fact that her formal education was basic – she did not have 
a college degree, and her ignorance was appalling4 – Elena was presented as a 
scientist, and she was awarded a PhD in chemistry. In the early 1960s she was 
secretary of the party committee of the Bucharest-based Central Institute for 
Chemical Researches and, when her husband assumed leadership of the party 
in March 1965, she became head of the Institute. The same year she was elected 
a member of the newly-established National Council of Scientific Research and 
a year later, in 1966, she was awarded the Order of Scientific Merit First Class. 
In 1974 she became member of the Romanian Academy’s Section for Chemical 
Sciences. During the period when her husband ruled Romania, Elena received 
many honorary awards for scientific achievement in the field of polymer chem-
istry. Every international visit of Nicolae Ceauşescu brought an international 
scientific title for her. Thus, official propaganda tried to sway the nation into 
believing that Elena Ceauşescu was a pioneer of Romanian chemistry (more in 
4 As it came out after the fall of the communist regime, all her scientific papers had been 
penned by others.
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Olteanu 2004), and the label “scientist of world renown” (Rom. savant de renume 
mondial) was automatically attached to her name.
Even though she frequently accompanied her husband on his official vis-
its abroad, it was not until 1971 and their visit to the People’s Republic of China 
that she began to engineer her own political rise. For Elena, this journey, dur-
ing which she had the chance to see how Jiang Qing, Chairman Mao Zedong’s 
wife, exerted control over many of China’s political institutions, including the 
media and propaganda, was a real political epiphany which accelerated her politi-
cal rise (Ducret 2013, 158). In 1972 Elena Ceauşescu became a full member of 
the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee and a year later, in 1973, 
she was elected to the party’s Executive. In 1975, she was elected to the Grand 
National Assembly, the country’s national legislature, and in 1980 she was made 
First Deputy Prime Minister, a title invented just for her, which she bore until 
she was executed in 1989.
Having successfully implemented the lessons she learned from Jiang 
Qing in 1971 and fascinated by her political jargon, Elena apparently decided to 
follow in the steps of another woman of power in order to polish her image, Isa-
bel Peron. Hence she took a trip to Buenos Aires in 1973, where she was struck 
by the life path of this former dancer who became vice-president alongside her 
husband in the September 1973 election (ibid. 161). She adopted from Peron 
the image of a compassionate mother to become the “Mother of the Nation” 
herself. Thus, perhaps as a result of these encounters, or because the propaganda 
architects became aware of the artificiality of two previously promoted aspects 
of her image (politician and scientist), they introduced a unifying, human com-
ponent: a woman, a mother, even a daughter of the nation (as Nicolae Ceauşescu 
was “the most beloved son of the nation”), adding to all these the attribute of 
exceptionalism. From the 1980s, Elena Ceauşescu becomes omnipresent at pub-
lic events; in widely-distributed official photographs she is usually dressed in 
white and surrounded by children and doves. Television cameras covering the 
couple’s official visits to villages or factories record an immutable ritual: children 
welcoming them with bread and salt, Elena thanking them and caressing them 
lovingly. More and more, she becomes holy Elena, mother of the Romanian fa-
therland and of all Romanian children (ibid. 163).
Marry Ellen Fischer, a US expert on Romania and keen observer of 
Ceauşescu’s leadership, pointed out that Elena, unlike her husband, lacked cred-
ibility in the country: “Despite the praise heaped upon her by the Romanian 
press, Elena Ceauşescu is not a popular personality in most of the country. She 
does not project the practical competence and concern of an Eleanor Roosevelt 
or the mystical charm and beauty of Eva Peron. Although Nicolae Ceauşescu’s 
image has become extremely ostentatious and lacking in credibility, it remains 
more palatable than hers; at least, Romanians say, he earned his high office, rising 
to the pinnacle of power through hard work and political skill. She, on the other 
http://www.balcanica.rs
A. Sorescu Marinković, Elena Ceauşescu’s Personality Cult 349
hand, is regarded as the undeserving beneficiary of his generosity. She does have 
the revolutionary credentials as a textile worker and communist activist in the 
1930s, but those activities are not as documented as her extravagant use of furs 
and designer fashions in the 1970s and 1980s” (Fischer 1989, 172).
If Nicolae Ceauşescu’s life “started at 50”, Elena Ceauşescu’s public (and, 
we could add, mythical) life started at 60. It should be said, however, that she 
had the year on her birth certificate changed from 1916 to 1919, so as not to be 
older than her husband who was born in 1918 (Avram 2014). On the occasion 
of her first nationwide birthday celebration, on 7th January 1979, when she ac-
tually turned 63, the press stated that Comrade Elena was celebrating 60 years 
of life and 40 years of revolutionary activity (Olteanu 2004). After this date, her 
age was not to be mentioned any more. Her real age and appearance, as much as 
his, were to be concealed by using anniversary paintings or carefully retouched 
photographs in the printed press, or by shooting her from a distance and favour-
able angles, so her face could not be clearly discernible. Every image of hers was 
meticulously scrutinized before being approved for consumption by the wide 
audience.5
The 1980s were inaugurated by the advent of co-management of the 
Ceauşescu couple. By 1979, Elena Ceauşescu’s cult had become merged with 
her husband’s, and she was not referred to as his wife, but as a “genius” scientist 
in her own right. Lucian Boia finds the origins of Elena’s cult in her and Nico-
lae’s poor background. Linking their personalities together, their backgrounds 
exacerbated their frustrations and transformed them into megalomania, “which 
they fed and stimulated in each other” (Boia 2001, 127–128). Everything from 
the pharaonic style of buildings to the construction of cities which were sup-
posed to completely replace “backward” villages had been symptoms of the presi-
dential couple’s complexes and their belief that history was somehow obligated 
to reward their efforts. Boia’s paradigm regarding the presidential couple can 
be summarized as follows: megalomaniac leaders driven by their background-
5 Dana Mustata quotes the former news desk deputy chief editor at Romanian television, 
Teodor Brateş, who recalls the Ceauşescu couple watching the broadcast of a meeting be-
tween Bulgarian President Zhivkov and Ceauşescu: “After they saw the televised images on 
their home screen, a scandal blew up as they found themselves looking old, wrinkled and ges-
ticulating inappropriately. Those involved in filming the event were threatened with the most 
severe sanctions. However, a screening of the filmed materials held at the public broadcaster 
showed the opposite: the dictatorial couple had been filmed from a distance, from favour-
able angles and were by no means misrepresented. Upon closer investigation, it eventually 
turned out that the images watched by the dictatorial family on their home screen belonged 
to Bulgarian television, and their confusion had been exacerbated by the fact that towards 
the end of their regime the two were interested only in images, wanting to look good and to 
be admired by the masses, and therefore muted the sound on their television sets” (Mustata 
2013a: 117). 
http://www.balcanica.rs
Balcanica XLVIII (2017)350
related pathology and sustained by the Romanian historical and cultural legacy 
of passivity (Grec 2016, 53). 
Romanian television as a propaganda medium
Mass-media were instrumental in making the Ceauşescus into idols. There were 
several vehicles for the propagation of their personality cult, such as homage 
volumes, gramophone records, films, TV and radio programmes, events around 
23th August and homage events in the country and abroad (Marin 2016), but 
it was the printed press and television which had a decisive role. By the 1980s, 
both the printed media and television propagated their personality cult more 
than anything else. Paradoxically, this led to their detachment from the social 
reality in the country as well as from the growing civil hostility towards them 
(Mustata 2013a: 111).
The Romanian state television (TVR) was launched on 31st December 
1956 (and at that point was combined with radio). The period from the mid-
1960s until the end of the 1970s was the golden age of Romanian television: 
investments in equipment and personnel were made, genres greatly diversified, 
television reporting and investigative journalism developed, a second channel 
was added. However, at the end of the 1970s TVR entered its dictatorial phase, 
which lasted throughout the 1980s. Programmes became politicized and were 
made to please the dictator Ceauşescu; the diversity of genres was reduced to 
political programming alone and broadcast content became scarce. The second 
channel, added in 1968, was shut down in 1985, as were the TVR local stations. 
Being aware of the enormous potential of television, power holders cut down 
broadcast hours to a minimum, which in the second half of the 1980s amounted 
to two hours a day. In that way the censorship and propaganda departments 
were able to take full control over television content (more in Mustata 2013a; 
Matei 2013). 
The exceptionalism of Romanian television among the other socialist 
televisions in Europe transformed it, in the second half of the 1980s, into the 
most absurd mass-media institution on the continent. It broadcast 20–30 hours 
a week (less than in 1965), most of which was black and white (a unique case in 
all of Europe) and devoted to the activity of the presidential couple. Even if the 
rise of Ceauşescu’s personality cult, which peaked in the 1980s, was probably 
the main trigger for this dictatorial phase of Romanian television, the economic 
crisis the country was experiencing at the time should not be underrated either 
(Mustata 2013a, 107). However, with its outdated equipment, enormous delay 
in introducing colour broadcasting, and dull programming, TVR faced stagna-
tion or even regression long before the Romanian economic crisis broke out.
The last decade of totalitarian power in Romania was characterized by 
television and other media being under the personal control of Nicolae and 
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Elena Ceauşescu themselves. Towards the end of the 1980s, television had only 
one role: to trumpet the Ceauşescus’ invincibility and support their idolization. 
In line with this, broadcasts made systematic use of visual codes and clichés that 
underlined their personality cult. Be it the coverage of one of Ceauşescu’s work 
visits, the celebration of a national event or the inauguration of a new factory, a 
common denominator for most broadcasts was the presence of masses of people 
made up of tiny, undifferentiated human figures paying homage to the heroes, 
waving scarves in the colours of the Romanian flag and singing patriotic songs 
(Mustata 2013a, 115). Through the use of such visual representation, the two 
Ceauşescus were identified as beloved leaders, cherished by all and distinguished 
for their personal and social merits.
As the video archives of Romanian television are still difficult to access, 
my findings are based on the analysis of the TVR Sunday to Saturday listings 
magazine, Tele Radio.6 As Elena Ceauşescu was born on 7th January, I shall fo-
cus on the week in January containing this day to determine at which point 
in time and to which extent the homage TV shows broadcast for her birthday 
influenced state television programming. I shall also examine the other January 
days infused with meaning in the new communist calendar, and the treatment 
they were given in the printed press.
A shift in orientation and intensified communist propaganda meant to 
support Ceauşescu’s personality cult can be detected even by analysing the front 
page of the TV listings magazine. If between 1968 and 1975 it mainly featured 
photographs of famous entertainers, people of culture, TVR newscasters or just 
artistic images, in the second half of the 1970s the front cover was monopolized 
by photographs of industrial or agricultural workers. From 1983 on, text prevails: 
slogans and incentives to peace and work or previews of the ever more numerous 
TV programmes boosting the cult of personality of the two Ceauşescus. This is 
also the year when Nicolae Ceauşescu’s portrait was first featured on the front 
cover on his birthday, 26th January.7 It should be noted that Elena Ceauşescu’s 
portrait never appeared on the front cover, only inside the TV magazine.
The adulation lavished on Ceauşescu’s was ubiquitous in TVR pro-
grammes, with the exception of its entertainment content which, however, was 
almost non-existent in the last years of communist rule. On Sundays, when the 
daily broadcasting time was the longest, the first programme, Lumea copiilor 
(Children’s world), featured a “literary-musical-choreographic show” called Sun-
tem copiii Epocii de Aur (We are the children of the Golden Age) or an editorial 
titled Cutezători, păşim pe drumul de glorii (We bravely march on the road of glo-
6 Initially a radio listings magazine, it was called Programul de radio, and then, with the advent 
of television, Programul de radio şi televiziune. Between 1968 and 1982, its name was Radio-
TV, and after this date it became Tele Radio.
7 Personal communication of Vasile Isache, http://tvarheolog.wordpress.com. 
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ry), which were mainly devoted to praising the leader. There followed two short 
shows of 15–20 minutes, Sub tricolor la datorie (On duty under the tricolour) and 
Viaţa satului (Village life), both containing moments devoted to the directives 
of comrade Ceauşescu, which did not leave too much time for the nominally an-
nounced topics. The afternoon show Album duminical (Sunday album) featured 
patriotic songs, poems or choreographies, ending the first part of the Sunday 
programmes. After a four-hour break, programmes resumed with the first news 
bulletin (Telejurnal), which invariably started with Nicolae Ceauşescu’s activi-
ties: work visits, receptions of ambassadors, congratulatory telegrams, or record 
agricultural production per hectare etc. The prime-time show was Cântarea 
României (Singing of Romania),  a cluster of cultural events organized by the 
Council for Socialist Culture and Education with the aim of promoting mainly 
folk art and artists, but also choral music. In the second half of the 1980s, the slo-
gan of this show was Omagiu ţării şi conducătorului iubit (Homage to the country 
and its beloved leader): each administrative region of Romania prepared such a 
show once a year, as a present to the presidential couple.
Apart from Sundays, however, tribute shows to Ceauşescu were aired all 
the other days as well: Monday – Ce-ţi doresc eu ţie, dulce Românie (What I wish 
for you, sweet Romania), patriotic and revolutionary songs; Tuesday – Ţara îţi 
făureşte visul (The country is fulfilling your dream), patriotic and revolution-
ary songs; Wednesday – Trăim decenii de împliniri măreţe (We live in decades 
of great accomplishments), a 30-minute “literary-musical-choreographic show”, 
and Te cântăm, iubită ţară! (We sing of you, beloved country), Romanian popu-
lar music; Thursday – presenting the winners of the national festival Cântarea 
României; Friday – Copiii cântă patria şi partidul (Children singing of the home-
land and the party); Saturday – Ţara sub tricolor, sub roşu steag (The country un-
der the tricolour flag, the red flag). The two hours of broadcasting per day in the 
second half of the 1980s would also squeeze in 15-minute documentaries (the 
average length of a TV show in this period) on the builders of the Golden Age, 
the beauty of the homeland, Romanian glorious history, the Nicolae Ceauşescu 
era – an era of great revolutionary accomplishments, Romanian education, re-
search and production, Romania in the world etc.
Elena Ceauşescu’s personality cult in the month of January
Expectedly, the personality cult would gain in intensity around the birthdays of 
the two Ceauşescus, the national holidays – 23rd of August (marking the 1944 
overthrow of the pro-fascist government of Marshal Ion Antonescu) and 1st of 
May (Labour Day) – and the RCP congresses.8 As for Elena Ceauşescu, she also 
8 The propagandistic delirium reached its culmination in November 1989, on the occasion of 
the 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. For whole seven days, TVR broad-
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confiscated 1st and 8th March, days honouring mothers and women. After 1983, 
almost the whole month of March was dedicated to the “Mother of the Nation”, 
honoured through the Omagiu TV shows (music or poetry shows meant to glo-
rify her qualities as a woman, mother and wife, but also as the foremost scientist 
of the country and a remarkable politician). The printed media were even more 
crammed with echoes of the birthday, as the available print space remained more 
or less the same,9 while the broadcast hours were drastically reduced. If March, 
traditionally women’s month, was confiscated by Elena Ceauşescu, January was 
monopolized by both Ceauşescus. It is remarkable, however, how the commu-
nists seized this month, on TV and in the mass-media in general.
The public observance of Christmas, the most important religious holi-
day in Romania alongside Easter, was tacitly banned in the communist period 
when concepts such as religion or Jesus Christ were erased from the vocabu-
lary. As atheism became state religion, the birth of Jesus was replaced by the 
New Year’s Eve; the Christmas holidays – by the winter holidays; Christmas 
carols – by patriotic songs; Moş Crăciun (Father Christmas) – by his communist 
counterpart, Moş Gerilă (Grandfather Frost), who arrived not on 24th Decem-
ber, but on 1st January, which also became the new date for decorating not the 
Christmas tree, but the winter tree. However, in spite of official discourse, the 
tree was usually decorated ahead of time in almost every home, but kept away 
from the window, lest someone see it, and the family would reunite around the 
Christmas table, in accordance with tradition. Christmas was a silent holiday, 
still celebrated but behind closed doors. To compensate for this erasure of tra-
ditional holidays and for emptying this season of symbolic substance, the New 
Year’s Eve was magnified and made into the most important day of the winter 
season. As it provided an opportunity to list the accomplishments of the Party 
and set new goals for the upcoming year, it was propagandistically exploited to 
the maximum. As far as television goes, though, the three days around the turn 
of the year offered a densely packed programme which included not only politi-
cast only internal news bulletins, homage shows, documentaries and coverage of the huge 
communist meeting, meant to celebrate the great socialist victories in Romania. No art film, 
no theatrical production, no entertainment, no cartoons were broadcast in their traditional 
Saturday or Sunday time slots, making Romania look more like a country in mourning than 
in a celebration mode (personal communication of Vasile Isache, http://tvarheolog.word-
press.com).
9 For example, the Scânteia issue of 8th March 1984 was a festive one meant to celebrate the 
mothers and women of Romania, but there was only one object of the panegyrics: Elena 
Ceauşescu, the woman. She was celebrated on all the pages of the newspaper: her scientific 
contribution, her worldwide renown, her books published in the country and abroad, her 
qualities as an ideal woman, mother, daughter of the country (personal communication of 
Vasile Isache, http://tvarheolog.wordpress.com).
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cal but also entertainment content. In the 1980s, these three days were the apex 
of RTV programming, practically the only days RTV was worth watching.
Admittedly, January was the month with the biggest potential for in-
venting communist traditions. Being the first month of the year was heavily 
significance-laden in itself. With Christmas having been pushed aside, after the 
grand celebration of the New Year’s Eve, the communist year could begin, com-
mitments for the following months could be made. As far as anniversary dates 
are concerned, January abounded in them. First, there still were echoes of the 
declaration of the People’s Republic of Romania from the end of December,10 
both in the printed press and on TV. Second, an important date that the com-
munists appropriated and included in their new calendar was 15th January, the 
birthday of Mihai Eminescu, a Romantic poet often regarded as the greatest Ro-
manian poet. Third, and most important, the birthdays of both Ceauşescus were 
in January, which fitted perfectly into this new system of measuring (new) time.
If in the beginning the communists were hesitant regarding Mihai Emi-
nescu, by the middle of the 1960s the poet had become a perfect symbol for 
the communist ideals to cluster around. After truncating the poet’s work and 
eliminating from it fragments that lacked anti-capitalist overtones, after eras-
ing references to the poet’s anti-Semitic views from the History of Romanian 
literature and republishing his sanitized poems together with numerous volumes 
of praising literary critics, Eminescu’s position as the supreme representative of 
Romanian spirituality was secured. After 1965, the universal character of the 
poet was strongly emphasized; it is not a coincidence that this offensive took 
place at exactly the same time as the large-scale campaign of promoting Roma-
nia at a global level which Ceauşescu undertook (Boia 2015, 165).
Like all other commemorations of important people, mainly rulers, 
from Romanian history, Eminescu’s also had only one aim: to glorify Nico-
lae Ceauşescu and secondly, but not less notably, his wife, through a primitive 
method of mythological transfer: “All heroes of the nation were called, by turn, 
to warrant for and to support the most famous of them all, the one who was 
fulfilling the entire Romanian history” (ibid. 168). One of the literary figures in 
service of the communist government, Geo Bogza, in an acclamation to Mihai 
Eminescu, posed a rhetorical question: “How about starting counting the year, 
our year, from January 15?”; probably a subversive suggestion, as the birthdays of 
the two Ceauşescus were also in January (ibid. 164).
Nevertheless, the day of the poet’s birth (and death), as it was com-
memorated on TV, did not have anything special in comparison to those of the 
presidential couple. After the drastic reduction of TV broadcast hours in the 
10 The People’s Republic of Romania was declared on 30th December 1947, after the forced 
abdication of King Mihai I of Romania. The country bore that name until 1965, when it was 
changed to the Socialist Republic of Romania.
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first half of the 1980s, there was not much time for anything anyway: generally, 
Mihai Eminescu’s commemoration would last 30 minutes. But, from November 
1988 every Monday evening TVR broadcast 15 minutes of patriotic poems and 
songs under the title Ce-ţi doresc eu ţie, dulce Românie (What I wish for you, 
sweet Romania), Eminescu’s line which became emblematic of the communist 
credo. This is also the moment when TVR programmes are re-extended to 3 
hours per day.
After the country became the Socialist Republic of Romania in 1965, 
which put an end to the January commemoration of the declaration of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Romania, the first month of the year was further inflated, sym-
bolically and propagandistically, on the small screens and in the printed press by 
adding one more celebration, which was to remain in the communist calendar 
until 1989: 26th January, Nicolae Ceauşescu’s birthday. But it was not until the 
beginning of the 1980s that this new calendar became complete, by adding one 
more date: 7th January, Elena’s birthday.
A comparison between the TV listings for the same day but different 
years, 1977 and 1987, shows the extent of the impact of her personality cult on 
TV programming (fig. 1 and fig. 2). As we can see, in 1977 TVR had two televi-
sion channels (TV1 and TV2) and two radio channels. The 7th of January was 
a weekday that year, Friday. TV1 started broadcasting at 10:00 with Teleşcoală 
(TV school), as school children had their winter holiday. At 11:00, Matineu de 
vacanţă (Holiday matinee) featured a Romanian movie for children followed by 
a five-minute news magazine with which the first part of programmes ended, 
at 12:25. The afternoon part started at 16:00 with a half hour of TV school, 
followed by a half hour of the French language course and by a 105-minute-
long German language programme. There followed the 10-minute lotto draw, 
a music show of 25 minutes, and 1001 de seri (1001 evenings), a children show 
of 10 minutes broadcast every evening between 1970 and 1980, featuring the 
Mihaela cartoons by the famous Romanian cartoonist and director Nell Cobar. 
The evening news, Telejurnal, scheduled for 19:30, lasted half an hour, and was 
followed by 10 minutes of economic news. The evening movie, a French-Italian 
co-production, was followed by Revista literar-artistică tv (A literary-artistic TV 
review), world news and local news. The evening programming closed at 23:00. 
On the same day between 17:00 and 23:00 TVR’s second channel featured Ro-
manian folk and classical music, comedy, travel documentary, music, cartoons, 
news magazine, opera, moments from the history of Romanian science and the 
portrait of a Romanian painter. Elena Ceauşescu was nowhere to be mentioned 
on TV on her birthday in 1977.
The following year, 1978, broadcasting hours were already reduced: al-
though 7th January was a Saturday, broadcasting started at 12:00, and not at 
10:00 as it had before, but there still were no shows connected to Elena’s birth-
day celebration. In 1979 we can notice the first attempts to put together a TV 
http://www.balcanica.rs
Balcanica XLVIII (2017)356
schedule which would accommodate tribute programmes praising Romania’s 
first lady. Even if the titles of the programmes in the TV listings for that day 
do not refer explicitly to Elena Ceauşescu, who was celebrating 60 years of life 
and 40 years of revolutionary activity, at least some of the shows or parts of 
the shows broadcast on that day were directly connected with her: Vârsta de 
aur a chimiei româneşti (The golden age of Romanian chemistry) – 15 minutes; 
Prestigiul chimiei româneşti (The prestige of Romanian chemistry) – 30 min-
utes; Glas de bucurie (The voice of happiness), a “literary-musical-choreographic 
show” – 60 minutes. This was dictated by the printed press (Scânteia) which 
marked the first national, public celebration of Elena with an “ardent homage 
from the party and the people” printed in red ink. This is the year which marks 
a change in her status: she becomes a heroine; after that date, the number of 
epithets attached to her name only grows.
However, TVR still had to wait a few years for the Omagiu format to 
take its final shape, on air and on the pages of the listings magazine. In 1984, the 
two-part format of the Omagiu show was already established: 1) a documen-
tary about Elena Ceauşescu; and 2) a “literary-musical-choreographic show”. It 
lasted 70 minutes and was aired in prime time: 19:20–20.30. In 1985, when 7th 
January was on Monday, the broadcasting time was already cut down to only 
two hours a day (from 20:00 to 22:00), with Omagiu lasting exactly 60 minutes. 
In 1987, when Elena Ceauşescu’s birthday was on Wednesday, Omagiu occu-
pied 75 minutes of the two hours of the total broadcasting time (see fig. 2). In 
Fig. 1 Romanian TV listings 
for Friday, 7 January 1977
(courtesy of http://tvarheolog.
wordpress.com)
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1988, the show lasted 70 minutes, and on 7th January 1989, Elena Ceauşescu’s 
last birthday was celebrated with a 70-minute TV show, this time titled Vibrant 
omagiu (Vibrant homage). We can notice that the shorter the daily broadcast-
ing time, the longer and more suffocating the homage shows devoted to Elena 
Ceauşescu.11 In addition, more and more space in the TV magazine was allotted 
to the framed text which announced the show combined with a painted portrait 
of the Ceauşescu couple.
If at first no attention was paid to the way in which the names of Nicolae 
and Elena were printed, it later became a rule to print their names in capital let-
ters and ensure that they were not split at the end of a line in order to avoid the 
risk of funny wordplays being made. From the first colour issue of the TV list-
ings magazine in 1968 until the end of the 1970s, all colours were used, but from 
1979, apart from black, only red and blue remained, probably to symbolize the 
Romanian flag (red, yellow and blue). The use of colours was only allowed for 
11 As Anikó Imre notices, unlike television in the United States which explicitly favoured 
the housewife receptive to advertising, socialist TV “targeted the man or masculine worker, 
who plops down on the sofa after a long day at the factory” (Imre 2016, 191). In the 1980s, 
however, Romanian television developed a strong propaganda agenda to promote the ideal 
socialist woman, modelled by Elena Ceauşescu: “Noi, femeile and Universul femeilor discussed 
agricultural work, the working woman, women leaders in different professions, the revolu-
tionary woman and the many virtues of Elena” (ibid. 192). It must be said that these pro-
grammes are definitely older than the 1980s, but their agenda drastically changed these years.
Fig. 2 Romanian TV listings for 
Wednesday, 7 January 1987
(courtesy of http://tvarheolog.
wordpress.com)
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the Monday, Wednesday and Friday pages. If Nicolae’s or Elena’s birthday were 
not on one of those days, the editors would squeeze two weekdays on the black 
and white pages, omitting several show titles, so that the greetings and the spe-
cial birthday programme could be printed on a colour page.12 If 23rd August or 
1st May did not fall on a colour page day, then the whole magazine was printed 
in black and white.13 From the autumn of 1988, colour disappeared completely 
from the inside pages, and only remained on the magazine cover.
As TVR in the 1980s was reduced to a medium of broadcasting (for) 
Nicolae and later Elena Ceauşescu, with abundant representations of worship, 
shrunken broadcast hours, duller and duller programmes and no entertainment, 
the Romanian audience lost all interest in TVR and watching foreign televisions 
became a mass phenomenon (Mustata 2013b; Sorescu-Marinković 2010; 2012). 
The dictatorial couple became the directing figures behind TV programmes, 
the main actors on the small screen and, more than that, the target audience of 
TVR. As Radio Free Europe stated in 1985: “Romanian television has the rare 
privilege of being a private television, a state television representing the viewing 
taste of one family” (Mustata 2013a, 116).
After a decade of watching the seemingly forever young Ceauşescu cou-
ple on TV every evening, in December 1989 Romanians were taken aback to see 
how old the two looked on their last, unretouched, live appearance. The whole 
country watched dumbstruck Nicolae Ceauşescu’s embarrassingly poor impro-
visation when he addressed the masses in Bucharest, a clear sign that the end 
of the “golden age” was drawing near. Symbolically, it was December, Christmas 
day, when they were executed.
Concluding remarks and implications
Elena Ceauşescu’s personality cult developed alongside her husband’s during the 
1970s, taking an independent turn from the beginning of the 1980s. However, 
unlike him, she lacked legitimacy and credibility, and her cult was built on shaky 
ground. The propaganda apparatus tried to compensate for this by an aggres-
sive glorification campaign. The Romanian television played a crucial role in the 
dissemination of her personality cult, after this institution became completely 
subjugated to the presidential couple and lost all of its functions, except as a 
propaganda medium. With its daily broadcasting time reduced to a minimum, 
the content of TV programmes was easy to control and the Ceauşescu couple 
12 In 1983, for example, the Scânteia issue of 8th January echoes Elena Ceauşescu’s celebration 
from the previous day by presenting two specialist volumes signed by her. In the following 
years, the headings and illustrations devoted to her on pages 1, 3 and 6 were in red ink.
13 Vasile Isache calls this situation “colour jealousy” (personal communication).
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was an everyday presence on the small screens of all Romanians, completely mo-
nopolizing TV on anniversary dates.
On the other hand, the symbolic appropriation of the first month of the 
year by the communists may be seen as a model of inventive and efficient propa-
ganda. Elena’s birthday was preceded by the New Year’s Eve and followed by two 
other important celebrations: the birthdays of Romania’s national poet Mihai Em-
inescu and Nicolae Ceauşescu, which automatically included her among the most 
famous Romanians. After the Revolution of December 1989 which marked the 
fall of the Romanian communist regime, January as the month of invented com-
munist tradition was disestablished and Elena, whose celebration was short-lived, 
was sent directly to the dustbin of history. Significantly, Mihai Eminescu’s statue 
appeared on the cover of the first issue of the TV listings magazine printed after 
the fall of communism, and the head title read: “On the centenary of the death of 
the national poet, the Romanian people was born again”. 
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